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Gestion des données pour les anthropologues: la prochaine étape de la 
gouvernance de l'éthique?  
Les demandes récentes de responsabilisation dans la « gestion des données » par les agences de 
financement, les universités, les revues internationales et d'autres institutions académiques ont 
inquiété de nombreux anthropologues et ethnographes. Bien que leurs exigences en matière de 
transparence et d'intégrité dans l'ouverture des données scientifiques à l'examen public semblent 
améliorer l'intégrité de la science, ces principes ne tiennent pas toujours compte de la manière dont 
les relations sociales de la recherche sont correctement entretenues. En tant que tremplin, ce Forum, 
déclenché par de telles demandes récentes de rendre compte de l'utilisation des « données », 
discute de l'état actuel de la recherche anthropologique et de l'éthique/l'intégrité académique dans 
une perspective plus large. Il donne spécifiquement la parole à nos préoccupations disciplinaires et 
conduit à une déclaration de principe qui clarifie une position particulièrement ethnographique. Cette 
position est ensuite discutée par plusieurs commentateurs qui traitent de sa viabilité et de sa 
nécessité dans le contexte de développements anthropologiques plus larges – soutenant l'idée de 
base qu'en ethnographie, les matériaux de recherche ont été coproduits avant d'être transformés en 
« données » marchandisé. Enfin, en allant au-delà d'une telle position, le Forum élargit la question au 
point où d'autres méthodologies et formes d'appropriation des matériaux de recherche devront 
également être considérées. 
Mots clés: gestion des données, épistémologie, éthique, gouvernance 
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DATA MANAGEMENT IN ANTHROPOLOGY: THE NEXT PHASE IN ETHICS GOVERNANCE? 
Peter Pels, Universiteit Leiden 
Since a number of years, academics are increasingly made accountable for managing data by 
university employers and funding agencies. Such forms of governance tend to defiﾐe さdataざ as 
already commodified units of analysis, alienated from the social relations of research by contractual 
forms of informed consent and anonymization, and by ownership claims by researchers and 
employers. Consequently, many ethnographic researchers feel uncomfortable with it – not least, 
because it distorts and contradicts a critical epistemology of social science in which researchers have 
stressed the foundation of objectivity in the intersubjective sociality of research.1 Is さdata 
managementざ indeed merely the scientistsげ dut┞ to be transparent to society, or a new phase in 
ethics governance? Does it once more reinforce ﾐeoliHeヴal ヴegiﾏesげ ethnocentric definitions of 
research sovereignty, just as some anthropologists suspected when ethical codes were being 
rewritten in the 1980s?2 
When Leiden University authorities recently made data management an issue, the Institute of 
Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology appointed an advisory committee on how 
anthropologists and ethnographers should position themselves. This Ioﾏﾏitteeげs position statement 
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 For one of the earliest and most profound statements of this position, see Fabian (1971). 
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on the co-production and co-ownership of research data triggered such interest and questions 
among colleagues in the Netherlands and abroad that we felt we should present it for more 
discussion. Before doing so, I want to clarify its position vis-á-vis a longer historical discussion of 
changing ethical governance in anthropology. 
Ethics in anthropology 
Anthropologists have always concerned themselves about ethics, but not only in the professional 
form that came to dominate Anglophone anthropology. The model of an ethical code reinforced by 
peer review and sanctions of a professional association – borrowed from doctors and lawyers – only 
appeared in anthropology after 1945, and was preceded by alternative standards such as the moral 
force of objective facts, or the さs┞ﾏpath┞ざ fieldworkers should e┝teﾐd to さﾐati┗esざ oヴ さaHoヴigiﾐesざ 
(Pels 1999). In the nineteenth century, the Aborigines Protection Society (founded in 1837) 
exemplified this earlier movement. Its offspring, the voluntary associations of ethnologists or 
anthropologists, continued to resemble humanitarian associations rather than professional ones until 
around 1900. Anthropologists first claimed professional ethical independence from colonial 
administrators, missionaries or traders when, for example, Franz Boas denounced anthropologists 
acting as spies for the American government in 1919, or Northcote Thomas claimed (rightly or 
wrongly) that his code of ethics barred him from divulging information about the Sierra Leonian 
Leopard Society in 1915 (Kuklick 1991: 201; Stocking 1979: 42-3). Nevertheless, the codification of 
ethics on the professional model came late to anthropology. A 1949 American attempt foundered 
and it was only during the Vietnam War that the momentum to draw up an ethical code gained 
sufficient force to produce the AﾏeヴiIaﾐ AﾐthヴopologiIal AssoIiatioﾐげs PヴiﾐIiples of Professional 
Responsibility of 1971. The political climate and accusations of anthropologists supporting USA 
counterinsurgency tactics ensured that the PPIげs fiヴst aヴtiIle defiﾐed the iﾐteヴests of the people 
studied as paramount, and came down heavily on secret and clandestine research.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that the politics of the AAA code came under attack when in the early 
1980s, American academic anthropologists were first outnumbered by those in extra-academic 
employ: anthropologists working outside the academy wondered how they could countenance an 
ethics that elevated the interests of people studied over their employersげ. More importantly, the 
global introduction of neoliberal forms of governance turned ethical codification into a monitoring 
mechanism, similar to audit.3 Even when anthropological ethics did not mutate into qualitative audit 
altogether (and much protest made sure it did not), it got caught up in a global shift towards 
accountability of oﾐeげs ヴeseaヴIh IoﾐduIt to┘aヴds eﾏplo┞eヴs. さAudit Iultuヴeざ fueled aﾐthヴopologistsげ 
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suspicions that Institutional Review Boards and Ethical Reviews in Anglophone anthropology 
sometimes seemed to worry more about the reputation of universities than about actual ethical 
conduct towards research participants. In its worst guises, neoliberal ethics served merely as a badge 
of good conduct, with sovereignty about ethical judgment monopolized by top-down standards set in 
review procedures that both determined access to and modified research. In traditions like the 
German and French, however, earlier critiques of the value of ethical codes were now also 
transferred to formalized review procedures: Anglophone anthropologists regularly express their 
envy of those places where ethical review has not gained the foothold it has in the United Kingdom 
or the USA.4 
The episteﾏology of aﾐthropological けdataげ 
This hasty overview raises the question whether recent data management requirements signal a 
continuation of neoliberal ethical governance, or a new and distinct phase? For an answer, we should 
disentangle some of the factors that contribute to this development: some are epistemological, 
reflecting the nature of human knowledge; others are political, indicating a specific historical 
conjuncture of power; and yet others are ethical, claiming to act for a collective good. The Leiden 
Ioﾏﾏitteeげs stateﾏeﾐt shows that we worry, firstly, about ownership of research materials (or 
さdataざ – more about this terminology below), but legal ownership does not always equal possession, 
nor does possession equal access to data.5 Anyone who works in the anthropology of heritage, for 
example, knows that access to a heritage site is distinct from both its management and its ownership 
(and that is not the only reason to consider social science data as indigenous or global heritage). 
Secondly, data management discussions often refer to a specific political conjuncture in the North 
Atlantic, where cases of scientific fraud have had a disproportional effect on science-society 
relationships, asking for both stricter accountability – that is, secondary fact-checking of scientific 
research – and more societal relevance (so that, for instance, decisions on research funding are 
increasingly determined by corporate agendas). While the political urgency of this situation cannot 
and should not be underestimated, it should not make us forget that universities were also meant to 
critique rather than affirm political fashions. Scientists investigate what is possible and necessary in 
the field of the production of knowledge, and reductionist definitions of research data may erase the 
variability of scientific perspectives and research paradigms. The Ioﾏﾏitteeげs statement not only 
emphasizes that さdataざ aヴe ┗aヴiaHle ふdepeﾐdiﾐg oﾐ ho┘ aﾐd ┘h┞ the┞ aヴe pヴoIessedぶ Hut also that 
the multiple modes of knowledge acquired during research – textual, audiovisual, object-like, or 
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 However, other forms of audit culture transformed European academic employer-employee relationships as 
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digital – cannot be reduced to the unitary category of さdataざ without loss. Assuming otherwise 
would, at the very least, replace what we know empirically about the production of knowledge in 
general by a narrow positivism that favors data that are already commodified because they should 
conform to the replicable formats of large-scale quantitative surveys and/or abstract experiments. 
Anthropologists occupy a special position in social science: field research turns them into their own 
research instruments. They cannot delegate the social relationships of research to interchangeable 
interviewers, questionnaires or experiments. Combining the design, execution and collaborative 
work of field research turns the depersonalization of such relationships into a problem rather than a 
given. They have to reckon with the empirical possibilities and limits offered by the contribution of 
research participants to the knowledge produced during research – what we, following many others, 
gloss iﾐ ouヴ stateﾏeﾐt as the さIo-pヴoduItioﾐざ of kﾐo┘ledge duヴiﾐg research.6 Moreover, the 
anthropological tradition of researching across difference provides an even deeper epistemological 
awareness.7 On the model of learning a strange language or culture, this not only requires 
recognizing that researcher and research participants occupy the same time-space, but also that they 
can only understand each other by intersubjective interchange (oヴ さtヴaﾐsaItioﾐal ┗alidit┞ざぶ aﾐd 
therefore through the changes they provoke in each other by mutual learning ふoヴ さtヴaﾐsfoヴﾏational 
┗alidit┞ざぶ.8 The model for this transformation is the mutual trust that is built up and maintained in 
every ethnographic relationship if it is to result in reliable knowledge.9 In anthropology and 
ethnography (but this may be valid for social science in general), methods and ethics are mutually 
supportive, congruent, and sometimes even identical. They rest on the same epistemological 
foundation of a process of mutual learning that builds social relationships on varying degrees of trust. 
Anthropologists should therefore insist on making an epistemological distiﾐItioﾐ Het┘eeﾐ さヴa┘ざ aﾐd 
さpヴoIessed dataざ, e┗eﾐ if such classifications only remain stable within specific, contingent contexts. 
We encounter and record research participants in situations and media where personal identification 
of and the borrowing of cultural knowledge from other people is not just inevitable: it forms the very 
foundation of scientific knowledge in ethnography. Moreover, we cannot transfer such knowledge to 
third parties without editing out the connections between names, faces, secrets, and interests – 
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 Fabian (1983) remains the paradigmatic statement on how researcher and researched share a time and space 
in which they co-produce knowledge in anthropology. 
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 This increasingly includes not just differences between humans, but between humans and nonhumans as well 
(see Tsing 2015). 
8
 Fabian (1971) first set out this model of transforming the researcher during fieldwork by discussing language 
learning. For the distinction between transactional and transformational validity, see Cho and Trent (2006). 
Again, Tsing (2015) suggests this is valid for mutual learning between humans and nonhumans as well. 
9
 As our statement argues, this does not deny that this trust can be overruled by values of a higher order in, for 
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which often renders it useless.10 Our raw research materials are saturated by personal information 
and (potential) cultural property precisely because they consist of those kinds of knowledge that are 
not, and sometimes cannot be, commodified – and yet fully determine social life. Extensive 
processing of raw materials (beyond mere anonymization) becomes inevitable if others are to reuse 
them. This explains why ethnographic researchers question the possible commodification of 
knowledge by pre-signed informed consent forms: they suspect that such quasi-contractual rituals 
may sign away ヴespoﾐdeﾐtsげ ヴightful claims to knowledge shared with researchers. Informed consent 
in ethnography is a process, and the quasi-legal finality of signing a form should not deceive 
researchers into believing that they can pocket otheヴ peopleげs IoﾐtヴiHutioﾐ to knowledge and simply 
foヴget aHout theiヴ iﾐteヴloIutoヴsげ Ilaiﾏs to own, possess or get access in the future (Fluehr-Lobban 
1994). 
Iﾐ shoヴt: さdataざ ownership, like research in general, is based in an epistemology of social process. 
Social process differentiates ownership, and take さdataざ away from the simplistic statement that, 
because researchers work for a certain organization (public university, private company, NGO), their 
employer also owns the さdataざ they produce. Beyond legal rights, researchers cannot shirk the 
ethical duty to monitor the changing forms and meanings of raw research materials as they are 
pヴoIessed iﾐto Ioﾏﾏodified さdataざ. Anthropologists have usually restricted the sharing of data with 
others (beyond the original research situation, where research participants and audiences – such as 
employers or authorities - may differ but also mingle) to publications in texts, audio-visual products, 
or on websites. In most cases, they were processed to safeguard the interests of co-producers of 
knowledge. Anthropologists increasingly provide access to research materials to third parties – 
Iolleagues, ﾏeﾏHeヴs of the ヴeseaヴIh paヴtiIipaﾐtsげ Ioﾏﾏuﾐities, authoヴities aﾐd otheヴ useヴs – but 
this implies the equivalent of anonymization, written or otherwise explicit informed consent, or 
conscious decisions whether the interests of co-producers of knowledge can be subordinated to 
overriding concerns. (This includes situations in which the historical value of cultural knowledge 
demands it should be made accessible to descendants of former research participants.) Finally, if 
third parties need to see sensitive raw materials because they supervise PhD-researchers who 
collected it, or because of accusations of scientific fraud, this requires such strict confidentiality that 
these thiヴd paヴtiesげ ヴightful Ilaiﾏ to o┘ﾐ oヴ aIIess those さdataざ is ﾐot ﾏatIhed H┞ eケual Ilaiﾏs to 
their possession. In other words, the co-production of data requires that ethnographers have the 
ethical duty to control how research materials さgo publicざ. This is, in fact, what already happens in 
the vast majority of cases. 
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Is さdata managementざ the ﾐew audit? 
After this introduction to and clarification of our original statement, we can return to the question 
whether data management signals a new phase in the ethical governance of anthropology. The 
current political conjuncture appears new to the extent that many anthropologists experience data 
management as a threat: as a denial of their ethical responsibility to control research materials that 
emerged from relations of co-production and mutual trust. The threat itself seems neoliberal in so 
far that it copies an earlier pattern of audit culture that says that, because lay people cannot check 
our reliability themselves, we better perform to these audiences as reliable (and risk becoming mere 
performance). The situation also resembles the 1990s in the sense that our current audiences are 
largely represented by our academic superiors, and that the assumption that such representation is 
factually adequate has to be constantly proven, as both managers and employees well know, not to 
degenerate into mere performance.  
Where current ethical governance-by-data management seems to move beyond a neoliberal culture 
of branding, performance aﾐd け┗isiHilit┞げ, ho┘e┗eヴ, is iﾐ its eﾏphasis oﾐ ケuestioﾐs of o┘ﾐeヴship. 
Here, we should note that a IoﾐIeptioﾐ of さdataざ as Ioﾏﾏodities, that can be freely distributed to 
third parties because they have been alienated from their relations of production, may exclude 
varieties of scientific experience - the professional identity of social scientists, humanities scholars, or 
even natural history scholars who use research procedures identical or comparable to ethnography 
in particular.11 This in itself shows that the ヴeduItioﾐ of ヴeseaヴIh ﾏateヴials to Ioﾏﾏodified さdataざ – a 
long-term tendency in other cultures of capitalism – is not universally shared among scientists and 
scholars. Current discussions suggest that even university managers can be persuaded of the ways in 
which such conceptions violate the original mandate of the academic production of knowledge, 
especially as far as ethical responsibility of researchers is concerned. In fact, one may well argue that 
we should respond to this situation as anthropologists have done so often (but maybe not always 
with enough conviction): that the concept of さdata managementざ obscures that the classification of 
ヴeseaヴIh ﾏateヴials as さdataざ is deceptive because, in the process of working on the materials 
gathered during research, they come to mean different things to different people. Our way of doing 
research – which can track processual change better than most survey and experimental techniques, 
because they tend to be static (Abbott 2001) – brings out such transformations of meaning. We have 
to respond to such changes if we are to remain responsible to our scientific mission, our research 
participants and audiences inside and outside the academy. The IoﾐIept of けdataげ Iaﾐ oHsIuヴe such 
transformations. Any properly social scientific conception of data management should therefore 
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start from the foundation of transformational validity and value-negotiation that all ethnographers 
are familiar with when doing research. 
 
Data management for Anthropologists and Ethnographers: A position paper 
Igor Boog, Henrike Florusbosch, Zane Kripe, Tessa Minter, Peter Pels, Metje Postma12 
From the first comprehensive codification of ethics in anthropology onwards,13 anthropologists and 
ethnographers felt primarily responsible in their management of data towards the people they study. 
Ethnographers recognize that social research is necessarily based in social relationships and 
therefore has to be built on a qualitative, intersubjective and value-laden foundation, usually based 
on mutual trust. Ethnographers therefore acknowledge that all social scientific data are co-produced 
by researchers and researched.14 The co-production of data implies that data are rarely fully owned 
by either researcher, researched, or a third party. The first duty towards science of anthropologists 
and ethnographers is therefore to recognize this joint production and joint ownership of data. All 
forms and norms of managing data depend on it.15 
The collaborative nature of ethnographic research highlights several complexities of social research 
in general. The recording of data, whether in written, oral or visual form, is a form of collaboration to 
which research participants have given their consent during fieldwork, including conditions 
pertaining to analysis and publication. Researchers should continue to treat data as collaborative for 
as long as they work with this material. Although the degree of involvement of research participants 
                                                            
12
 These scholars formed a committee that was asked to report to the Executive Board of the Institute for 
Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology of Leiden University on datamanagement policy for the 
Institute in September 2015. Peter Pels chaired the committee because of his prior work on anthropological 
ethics; Igor Boog contributed from a more quantitative methodological background; Henrike Florusbosch 
brought in her experiences in Dutch and American anthropology and interdisciplinary heritage studies; Zane 
Kripe added her expertise in digital anthropology; Tessa Minter works on ethics in development and indigenous 
rights and heritage; and Metje Postma could speak on behalf of visual ethnography and anthropology. They 
remain affiliated with Leiden, with the exception of Florusbosch, who has since returned to the University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
13
 The さPヴiﾐIiples of Pヴofessioﾐal ‘espoﾐsiHilit┞ざ of the AﾏeヴiIaﾐ AﾐthヴopologiIal AssoIiatioﾐ, adopted iﾐ ヱΓΑヱ 
(see the reprint and discussion in Fluehr-Lobban [1991]). 
14
 See, for some of the first statements of this epistemological condition, Fabian (1971, 1983). 
15
 Ethnographers therefore should not recognize, in the management of data, a contradiction between a duty 
towards science (as emphasized by, for example, the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Academic Practice of the 
VSNU) and a duty towards research participants (as emphasized by, for example, the code of ethics of the 
American Anthropological Association). While both positions and codes of conduct contain useful ethical 
principles and advice, our curreﾐt stateﾏeﾐt as a ┘hole ヴespoﾐds to the iﾐjuﾐItioﾐ to さappl┞ oヴ justif┞ざ suIh 
ethical principles by outlining the situations specific to our discipline (see VSNU, Netherlands Code of Conduct 
for Academic Practice, preamble, $5, http://www.vsnu.nl/files/documenten/Domeinen/Onderzoek/ 
The%20Netherlands%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20for%20Academic%20Practice%202004%20%28version%20
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in the analysis and publication of data varies from one research relationship to another, these two 
aspects of the scientific process are commonly understood as the prerogative of the ethnographer, 
especially since they depend on the processing of the raw materials of research by the researcher.16 
Yet this prerogative comes with both epistemological, methodological and ethical implications.  
The first implication has already been mentioned: because they express the fundamentally social 
relationship of research, data caﾐﾐot He full┞ けo┘ﾐedげ H┞ eitheヴ the ヴeseaヴIheヴ, oヴ H┞ the people 
ヴeseaヴIhed, oヴ H┞ the ヴeseaヴIheヴげs eﾏplo┞eヴs oヴ spoﾐsoヴs. The seIoﾐd iﾏpliIatioﾐ is that the 
individual researcher can and should be held responsible for the integrity, preservation and 
protection of the data gathered during a specific research project like any other caretaker of 
collective property or disciplinary standards. Thirdly, さ[ヴ]eseaヴIheヴs ha┗e aﾐ ethiIal ヴespoﾐsiHilit┞ to 
take precautions that raw data and collected materials will not He used foヴ uﾐauthoヴized eﾐdsざ. 17 
The individual researcher therefore has the duty to subordinate the sharing of data with third parties 
(including other scientists, also in cases of investigating fraud) to the recognition of the collaborative 
nature of data.   
Questions of authorizing data from a collaborative relationship and sharing those data beyond that 
relationship confront anthropologists and ethnographers with a range of possibilities, depending on 
the kinds of social relationship in which they engage when co-producing or sharing the data. These 
possiHilities ┗aヴ┞ fヴoﾏ full o┘ﾐeヴship of theiヴ o┘ﾐ さ┗oiIeざ H┞ people studied ふaﾐalogous to foヴﾏal 
intellectual or cultural property), through a variety of forms of authority over co-produced data (for 
example, when recorded by interviewing, photographing or film), to data individually authored by 
the researcher (such as records of observation in public spaces). In each case, consent in the co-
production of data is (re-) negotiated constantly from the beginning of field research. The contractual 
gesture of a consent form signed in advance cannot cover all contingencies of the process of 
transformation of knowledge that both researcher, research participants and audience undergo as 
the research proceeds towards publishing its results. Informed consent in ethnography is based on 
the incremental change of information obtained in the course of research, because raw research 
materials are processed into data (for example, by anonymization or analysis), or because third 
parties may intervene in the research relationship or form a new audience for it.18 Even when the (re-
) negotiation of consent usually stops at the end of fieldwork, ethnographers are responsible for 
making sure that changing forms of consent are reckoned with when data are used in research 
reports.  They should also make sure that data are only shared with third parties (other scientists, the 
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 See, for example, Mosse (2006). 
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 The AAA 2012 Statement on Ethics, http://www.aaanet.org/profdev/ethics/. 
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 The portrayal of research ethics in terms of a dyad of researcher and researched is a late colonial fiction that 
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geﾐeヴal puHliIぶ iﾐ ┘a┞s that sta┞ tヴue to these foヴﾏs of Ioﾐseﾐt. Aﾐthヴopologists Iaﾐ aIt さaﾐti-
soIiall┞ざ ふthat is, ┗iolate a Ioﾐseﾐt ヴelatioﾐship obtained during research) with justification when this 
consent relationship is trumped by considerations of greater scientific or social relevance.19 This, 
however, implies having clear reasons that state why the claim to ownership can be overruled in the 
specific relationship concerned.20 
さAﾐthヴopologists should deteヴﾏiﾐe ヴeIoヴd o┘ﾐeヴship  ヴelatiﾐg to eaIh pヴojeIt aﾐd ﾏake appヴopヴiate 
arrangements accordingly as a standard part of ethical practice. This may include establishing by 
whom and how records will He stoヴed, pヴeseヴ┗ed, oヴ disposed of iﾐ the loﾐg teヴﾏ.ざ21 In the case of 
collaborative data, record ownership is necessarily plural and collective. In most cases, it remains 
common practice for researchers to keep records in their personal custody and possession, and 
decide on a case-to-case basis whether data can be shared with third parties such as other scientists. 
Protection of data has become routine to the extent that in recent funding applications, researchers 
normally specify the norm to store digital data behind passwords. However, researchers have a 
primary duty to privilege requests for sharing data by people studied, unless they have reason to 
suspect this will harm or put at risk the (personal) safety or wellbeing of (individual members of) a 
group researched. PhD-students and their supervisors may confidentially share data gathered 
personally by the former (if only because supervisors are meant to coach PhD-students in the proper 
management of data), but supervisors should guard that trust as sacredly as when they engaged with 
their own research participants. In collective research projects, where sharing of primary data from 
PhD- or other research is part of the analysis, research data should initially be stored, preserved and 
disposed of in files not accessible to researchers other than those working on the project. In the case 
of audio-visual data, due to the fact that records of persons can often not be fully anonymized and 
that the impact of making them public is often more consciously dealt with by source communities, a 
common practice is to follow up initial consent by people studied with a reaffirmation by their 
viewing of the finished product, and by negotiations about ownership of and access to the 
recordings, conditions of publication, and copyrights of the eventually published film. For research 
that involves the collection of data in the form of items of material culture, ethnographers commonly 
follow the best ethical practices of ethnographic museums.22 Ethnographic data are increasingly 
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 See Mosse (2006). 
20
 This does not necessarily rule out the possibility of doing clandestine or secret research (that is, obtaining 
data without sufficient informed consent), but it emphasizes that in the history of anthropology and its 
involvement with intelligence gatheヴiﾐg aﾐd Ioヴpoヴate ヴeseaヴIh, oヴ ┘ith けヴepugﾐaﾐt otheヴsげ, the o┗eヴヴuliﾐg of 
informed consent obtained from people researched was based on political or economic values external to the 
theoretical or methodological considerations of science (see, among others, Harding [1991]; Kelly et al. [2010]). 
21
 The AAA 2012 Statement on Ethics, http://www.aaanet.org/profdev/ethics/. 
22
 For material culture, see, for example, http://arts.gov.au/collections/best-practice. In the case of the 
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gathered, produced, stored, circulated, and shared digitally through online third party services. This 
can create additional concerns regarding ownership, privacy and safety of research data, especially 
where researchers should exercise caution in choosing to whom they entrust the research material. 
In the online collection of ethnographic data ethnographers should adhere to both the ethical 
standards that pertain within the discipline and the considerations outlined by the Association of 
Internet Researchers.23 
All this implies that anthropologists and ethnographers, while adhering to the international principle 
of FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, Reusable) data, have to remain conscious of the fact 
that ﾏaﾐ┞ aIadeﾏiI defiﾐitioﾐs of さdataざ do not sufficiently distinguish between raw and processed 
research materials.24 The first category (which includes primary data such as field notebooks) 
contains personalized data and cultural and intellectual properties that cannot (yet) be openly 
accessed. Moreover, the boundaries between raw and processed data are drawn differently 
depending on whether the audience in question is interested in mere verification, publication, or 
reuse, and the drawing of that boundary, and therefore the provision of access to the data 
concerned, is the ethical responsibility of the researcher.  
Morover, many recent discussions about data management are more concerned with the possibility 
of sharing data with third parties as a means to prevent scientific fraud than with the sharing of data 
with the aim to improve scientific knowledge. These two goals have to be sharply distinguished: the 
second goal, which governs our statement, treats social scientific research as essentially based on a 
social relationship and therefore impossible without mutual trust, whereas the first starts from the 
initial assumption of mistrust. Sharing data can be a means to track down scientific fraud, and 
ethnographers have a duty to do so whenever possible. However, recent cases in the Netherlands 
where scientific fraud was suspected do not support the hypothesis that the publication of raw data 
will help to detect fraud more easily or prevent it from being committed. In the case of social 
psychologist Diederik Stapel, it was the failure of peer review by senior colleagues that allowed fraud 
to blossom, and courageous peer review by junior scholars of the unlikely consistency of published 
data that brought fraud to light. It was confirmed by public confession rather than the inspection of 
fraudulent data.25 In the case of anthropologist Mart Bax, the process of investigating possible fraud 
was started when a journalist made the inadequate reactions to critiques of implausible published 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
countries by privacy laws and collective property jurisprudence, which may shift the ethical discussion to the 
legal field. 
23
 See Ess et al. (2002), and Markham and Buchanan (2012). 
24
 See, for example, http://sedataglossary,shoutwiki.com/wiki/Research data 
25
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research findings public. The resulting diagnosis was that, whether fraud had been committed or not, 
the failure of contemporary mechanisms of peer review (which seem more firmly institutionalized 
today) was the primary cause of doubt.26 In both cases, the faithful implementation of normal 
procedures of proper scientific conduct – such as methodological accounting in published research 
reports; and peer review by both thematic and regional experts – seems both sufficient and most 
effective to safeguard the reliability of results and prevent fraud from happening. 
In the light of the collaborative nature of data, the increasing demand to include a Data 
managementplan (DMP) in applications for funding should therefore result in ethnographers adding 
the following clauses to their research proposal: 
- the data gathered during ethnographic fieldwork are held in the custody and possession of 
individual researchers, who protect the interests of people studied, unless otherwise stipulated; 
- the data can only be shared with third parties after they have been processed to safeguard the 
privacy and cultural property of research participants, depending on the ethical judgment of the 
researcher, unless otherwise stipulated; 
- they are stored and preserved by individual researchers until their retirement from actual research 
reporting, when they will be destroyed or returned to (heirs of) the research participants, unless 
otherwise stipulated; 
- third parties have no right to demand access to raw ethnographic research data except in the 
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Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner, University of Sussex 
Bob Simpson, University of Durham  
 
The research ethics landscape in the UK is currently complex and difficult to navigate. A central 
problem for social anthropologists is how to manage anticipatory review when using research 
strategies that are essentially exploratory and improvisatory. To focus, as Pels and others have done, 
on co-production as a foundational epistemological strategy is a useful way to side-step many of the 
difficulties that this tension throws up. In this comment, we further situate co-production within 
institutional frameworks and in relation to the radical changes promised by the enforcement of the 
EUげs Geﾐeヴal Data PヴoteItioﾐ ‘egulatioﾐ ふGDP‘ ヲヰヱヶぶ. 
 
Broadening the notion of co-production 
The co-production of knowledge during ethnographic fieldwork prioritises the relational, and 
therefore co-owned and evolving nature of research data. In advocating this approach, the position 
paper offers social anthropologists a route out of an increasingly regulated and commodified 
research environment. However, this notion of co-production does not fully capture the range of 
settings in which anthropologists work - institutional, multi-sited, virtual and across novel differences 
of power and resources. Though co-production strategies might solve some problems of data-
o┘ﾐeヴship, ┘e ┘oﾐdeヴ ┘hetheヴ けdataげ Io-ownership is always feasible and/or desirable. By 
uﾐpaIkiﾐg the iﾐstitutioﾐal Ioﾐte┝ts that fヴaﾏe ヴeseaヴIh aIti┗it┞ aﾐd けdata gatheヴiﾐgげ ┘e suggest that 
the notion of co-production could in fact be strengthened. For instance, by contextualising co-
production in a more systematic way, we may be able to deal more transparently with research 
けIollaHoヴatioﾐsげ that aヴe ﾐot Hased oﾐ prima facie assumptions of equality, equal motivation and 
equal control over ensuing data. Indeed, an increasing proportion of ethnographic research cannot 
build on mutual trust of the kind envisaged by Pels et al, cannot be transparent, and, moreover, is 
based on negotiated, ambiguous ethical tenets, often motivated by incompatible interests. For 
instance, collaborative fieldwork in a clinic may comprise a researcher detailing patient issues around 
uﾐauthoヴised IliﾐiIal iﾐteヴ┗eﾐtioﾐs, ┘heﾐ the ヴeseaヴIheヴげs pヴeseﾐIe ad┗eヴtises the IliﾐiIげs aIti┗ities. 
A more holistic notion of the co-production of knowledge should also include the roles played by 
funders, universities and the regulation of research ethics and data protection. 
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In the UK, the enforcement of the GDPR in May 2018 will have far-reaching implications for 
the research scope of anthropology. On the one hand, the GDPR is more prescriptive 
Ioﾏpaヴed to the Iuヴヴeﾐt Data PヴoteItioﾐ ‘egulatioﾐ ふDP‘ぶ, iﾐsistiﾐg that けValid consent for 
taking data needs to be clear and affirmative (it cannot be sileﾐt oヴ さiﾐfeヴヴedざ H┞ iﾐaIti┗it┞ぶげ. 
On the other hand, the GDPR recognises the importance of the social science to the public 
interest. This is an important shift given that the DPR treats the social sciences as protocol-
based research similar to medical sciences. In fact, the GDPR suggests that the social 
sIieﾐIes should He tヴeated as さacademic expressionざ aﾐd fヴaﾏed oﾐ aﾐ eケual Hasis to 
journalism. According to a joint submission by two UK funding agencies, the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) and the British Academy (BA), in response to a UK 
Government's Call for Views on the implementation of GDPR 2016/679 (Joint Submission 
2016), this reframing removes unnecessary hindrances from social-science research. It does 
so by recognising its methodological specificities, including participant observation, and by 
pointing out the inadequacy of requirements for detailed ex ante protocols, restrictions on 
the non-anonymous reporting of research, and prohibitions on the use of deceptive and/or 
covert methodologies.  
In relation to these key aspects of qualitative enquiry, the GDPR requires the use of 
derogations (legitimate curtailments of the original regulation) to interpret its main principles 
correctly. Thus, derogations from any part of the regulation are set out to curtail the primary 
principles set out in articles. As pointed out in the Joint Submission, they are “ﾐecessary to recoﾐcile 
the right to protection of personal data with the freedom of expression and informationざ ﾐot just as 
ヴegaヴds さjournalistic purposesざ ふtogetheヴ ┘ith liteヴaヴ┞ aﾐd aヴtistiI e┝pヴessioﾐぶ Hut also foヴ the 
puヴpose of さacademic ... expressionざ ふAヴtiIle Βヵ ふヲぶげ ふGDP‘ Iited iﾐ the Joiﾐt “uHﾏissioﾐ ヲヰヱΑぶ. 
 
Ensuring that anthropology departments are alert enough to use these derogations will be critical to 
the way in which universities implement the GDPR. Bearing in mind the complexities that researchers 
have faced as a result of the variable devolution of Research Ethics Committee responsibilities, 
researchers should be alert to the GPDR if its implementation is not to go the same way. Clear 
guidance from professional associations will be important to the future of ethnographic research. 
This will determine how and under what conditions we can insist on the effective co-ownership of 
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Joint Submission (2016) Submission to DCMS, (https://www.britac.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-05-
10%20DCMS%20GDPR%20Derogations%20submission.pdf) 
GDPR (2016) EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R067)  
 
Research Ethics Governance from Below: A Call for Joint Anthropological Action 
Hansjörg Dilger, Freie Universität Berlin 
Michael Schönhuth, Universität Trier 
Anita von Poser, Freie Universität Berlin 
We wholeheartedly welcome the initiative by Peter Pels and his colleagues from Leiden to 
intervene in the current phase of ethics governance by alerting us to the potentially 
pヴoHleﾏatiI effeIts this さﾐe┘ eヴaざ holds foヴ the field of ヴeseaヴch data management. We 
agree with Peter Pels that the specific characteristics of ethnographic research – e.g., the co-
production of data by researchers and their interlocutors, but also the impossibility to 
distinguish between raw and processed data in our discipline – make standardized ways of 
さﾏaﾐagiﾐg dataざ ケuestioﾐaHle, aﾐd poteﾐtiall┞ iﾏpossiHle. Our comment focusses on the 
necessity to initiate a dialogue on all these issues of ethics governance across different 
national academic cultures. As Peter Pels emphasizes, there have been significantly diverging 
ways in which anthropologists have responded – institutionally and discursively – to the 
various ethics governance phases within our discipline.  
In Germany, research ethics and their assessment through formalized procedures did not 
play a major role in social and cultural anthropology until the mid-1980s. The discussion took 
off pヴiﾏaヴil┞ afteヴ ヱΓΒΑ ┘ith the estaHlishﾏeﾐt of the さappliedざ HヴaﾐIhes of the disIipliﾐe. 
The Working Groups Development Anthropology and Medical Anthropology within the 
German Anthropological Association (GAA) implemented their own ethical guidelines in 
ヲヰヰヱ ふupdated iﾐ ヲヰヱンぶ aﾐd ヲヰヰヵ. Iﾐ ヲヰヰΒ, the GAA itself adopted its さFヴaﾐkfuヴt DeIlaヴatioﾐ 
oﾐ EthiIsざ, which is largely based on the declaration of human rights in the context of global 
interdependencies. The commitment of anthropologists in Germany to the ethical principles 
of these declarations, however, is largely voluntary and does not include the commitment to 
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More recently, the debate on research ethics within the GAA has intensified again, triggered, 
among other initiatives, by two workshops of the German Research Foundation on the 
さヴisksざ of soIial sIieﾐIe ヴeseaヴIh, as well as the introduction of obligatory ethics assessments 
in the European Union funding line Horizon 2020 (Unger, Dilger & Schönhuth 2016). In 2017, 
the GAA charged a working group with the preparation of a document that is supposed to 
guide local ethics committees in their assessment of anthropological research proposals on 
the basis of the methodological and epistemological standards of the discipline. The GAA, 
however, emphasizes that such formalized ethical reviews shall remain the exception within 
the discipline as an over-regulation of research ethics assessments may run counter to the 
core standards of ethnographic research with regard to the principles of reflexivity and 
methodological flexibility.  
The さ“peIialized Iﾐfoヴﾏatioﾐ “eヴ┗iIe ふFachinformationsdienst, FID) Social and Cultural 
Aﾐthヴopolog┞ざ, ┘hiIh opeヴates ┘ithiﾐ a laヴgeヴ Information Services Programme on behalf of 
the German Research Foundation, has raised similar concerns in reaction to the rising call for 
research data management initiatives as sparked by Science Europe, the Association of 
European Research Funding and Research Performing Organizations. In line with these 
initiatives, which promote the digitalization and storage of data as well as their use by third 
parties, the FID currently works at establishing a sustained research data infrastructure for 
anthropologists in Germany, which adheres to the particularities of ethnographic research. 
The GAA is thus currently confronted with the task of formulating a position in relation to 
these developments, analogously to the issues outlined above. 
Peter Pels asks ┘hetheヴ the foIus oﾐ ヴeseaヴIh data ﾏaﾐageﾏeﾐt is a ﾐe┘ de┗elopﾏeﾐt oヴ さa 
Ioﾐtiﾐuatioﾐ of the shifts iﾐ ethiIal go┗eヴﾐaﾐIe iﾐitiated uﾐdeヴ ﾐeoliHeヴal ヴuleざ.  Our 
experience in Germany shows that, compared to the 1990s, current forms of ethics 
governance are new in that they have become increasingly transnational with recent 
European directives introducing standardized formats for ethics assessment and research 
data management which affect ethnographic research in particular ways. Also, several 
international journals make the proof of a positive ethics committee vote mandatory for the 
















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
We think that, at this point, ethics governance should be acknowledged as a bottom-up 
process where relevant conventions and guidelines are formulated by anthropologists 
themselves – and in close collaboration with both the communities they work with as well as 
with colleagues beyond national or local academic contexts. This Social Anthropology forum 
should become a creative starting point for the development of such transnational action 
that will provide a strong background for anthropologists and anthropological associations 
to act upon specific challenges in their respective (national) academic and institutional 
environments. 
Reference 
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Subverting "formalised" ethics through mainstreaming critical research ethics and a responsive 
review process 
 
Rosa Cordillera A. Castillo, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
 
The intervention of Pels, and Boog and colleagues, while specific to issues of data management, also 
highlights problems with the current formalised ethics governance, particularly as practiced in 
Anglophone anthropology: (a) increased bureaucratisation, audit, and rigidity; and (b) incompatibility 
┘ith the ethﾐogヴaphiI ﾏethod ┘ith its laIk of appヴeIiatioﾐ of ethﾐogヴaph┞げs Ioﾏple┝it┞ aﾐd 
d┞ﾐaﾏiIs. That is, the Iuヴヴeﾐt foヴﾏalised ethiIs go┗eヴﾐaﾐIe is IoﾐtヴadiItoヴ┞ to aﾐthヴopolog┞げs 
epistemology and methodology. Furthermore, it does not necessarily ensure that a research will be 
conducted ethically.  
 
The key is the ethical researcher; not the ethics governance regime. Thus, there should be greater 
attention to the cultivation of ethical consciousness and behavior among researchers through 
pedagog┞ aﾐd pヴaItiIe. The aiﾏ is to de┗elop ヴeseaヴIheヴsげ IapaIit┞ to ﾏake ethiIal deIisioﾐs aﾐd 
actions and make ethical thinking and acting a fundamental part of all stages of our research and 
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on to use ethnographic methods in their eventual jobs, or enroll in graduate studies; but also 
because ethical praxis is a lifelong endeavor that is tested and reshaped in every aspect and stage of 
a sIholaヴげs ┘oヴk. 
 
“iﾐIe ┘e Iaﾐﾐot ┞et igﾐoヴe the pヴessuヴe fヴoﾏ fuﾐdeヴs aﾐd jouヴﾐals foヴ さfoヴﾏalisedざ ethiIs, ふfoヴ the┞ 
decide if we get published or funded, although there must come a time that this too must change), 
we ﾏust defiﾐe foヴ ouヴ disIipliﾐe ┘hat さfoヴﾏalisatioﾐざ of aﾐthヴopologiIal ethiIs ﾏeaﾐs aﾐd ┘hat it 
should be, and move away from the biomedical paradigm that dominates social research ethics 
go┗eヴﾐaﾐIe. Iﾐ otheヴ ┘oヴds, ┘e Iaﾐ suH┗eヴt さfoヴﾏalisatioﾐざ as it is currently defined and 
implemented, make it responsive to the needs, particularities, and complexities of our discipline, 
innovate the process so that it primarily equips researchers with the ability to make ethical decisions 
and actions, and insist that these aヴe ouヴ disIipliﾐeげs ヴespoﾐsi┗e, さfoヴﾏalisedざ ethiIs pヴoIeduヴes.  
 
A way to reinvent formalisation and subvert the dominant formalised ethics regime is through a 
combination of (a) mainstreaming critical research ethics; and (b) building a responsive review 
process. The first will entail making research ethics an integral part of the curriculum, in discussing 
and presenting a research project, and in deliberating the politics of knowledge production. The aim 
is to reframe the question of ethics from an afterthought in the conduct of research or a mere legal 
and bureaucratic requirement or burden, to one that is vital in shaping the various stages of the 
research process—from formulating our research questions and methodology, negotiating our 
fieldwork and relationships with our interlocutors, and managing our data, to writing and other 
forms of representation and professional engagement. That is, much in the same way that we are 
trained to reflect on the politics of knowledge production and our positionality, thinking and acting 
ethically can potentially become a fundamental part of our reflexivity and consciousness in all stages 
of our research practice. 
 
Meanwhile, the key features of a responsive review process are: careful and thorough discussion of 
actual and potential ethical challenges and possible ways of dealing with them; reflexive and 
transparent assessment of the ethical competence of the researcher and the supervisor/s; and 
meaningful participation of the people to be studied in the formulation of the ethical imperatives for 
the study. The pedagogical process is the key, guided by a panel competent not only in ethnography, 
but also in research ethics and the research context. This can be undertaken at the departmental 
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A responsive review process recognizes the uniqueness of every research context and its specific 
ethical complexities and dynamics. It recognizes as well the ethical implications of the power 
ヴelatioﾐship Het┘eeﾐ ヴeseaヴIheヴ aﾐd iﾐteヴloIutoヴ, aﾐd the ヴeseaヴIheヴげs positioﾐalit┞, ヴespoﾐsiHilities, 
and accountabilities during and after research, that is, in all acts of representation and engagement. 
 
Consistent and patient engagement with research ethics in teaching and in practice, of continuously 
and critically reflecting on ethical principles and developing our capacity for making ethical decisions 
and actions, facilitates the cultivation of ethical consciousness and discernment among our students 
and ourselves. Where the current system is reviewer and checklist dependent, what I propose gets 
its raisoﾐ d’être from the ethical researchers who, in the final analysis, are the ones confronted with 
ethical dilemmas which they have to resolve on the ground, during the entire fieldwork and beyond. 
The highly developed ethical researcher is our best protection from research misconduct, not the 
currently dominant formalised ethics regime.  
 
 
Doing Anthropology Ethically Takes Practice: A US Perspective on Formalization 
 
Rena Lederman, Princeton University 
 
This comment concerns the limitations of formalization in the governance of research ethics 
generally and fieldwork ethics particularly.27  Compared with the UK and EU, US experience is 
distinctive for its lengthy tenure. For over four decades, formal oversight has foregrounded 
putatively context-neutral philosophical principles and administrative procedures while 
backgrounding ethics as social practice (modes of さdoiﾐg togetheヴざぶ.  Foヴﾏalized ethiIs ヴe┗ie┘s aヴe 
so thoroughly integrated within US medical and educational institutions that for everyone from 
ethics board professionals to reluctantly-compliant ethnographers, it is as if formal reviews 
themselves eﾐaIt さthe ┗eヴ┞ ideaざ of ヴeseaヴIh ethiIs.   
 
‘elatedl┞, the ヴegulatoヴ┞ defiﾐitioﾐ of さヴeseaヴIhざ tヴeats h┞pothesis-testing designs as the standard 
against which other research styles are judged (Lederman 2007), rendering invisible fundamental 
differences between design and discovery epistemologies. With prior design methods as the 
                                                            
27
 This aヴtiIle Hegaﾐ as aﾐ iﾐ┗ited talk duヴiﾐg Pleﾐaヴ┞ sessioﾐ IV さDoiﾐg Aﾐthヴopolog┞ EthiIall┞: Is Foヴﾏalizatioﾐ けThe 
“olutioﾐげ?ざ: ﾏaﾐ┞ thaﾐks to oヴgaﾐizeヴs Aﾐita ┗oﾐ Poseヴ aﾐd the Hoaヴd of the Geヴﾏaﾐ AﾐthヴopologiIal AssoIiatioﾐ at the 
2017 GAA annual meeting.  It does not comment directly on Boog, Florusbosch, Kripe, Minter, Pels, and Postmaげs 
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regulatory standard, emergent discovery methods are systematically disadvantaged in ethics 
reviews.   
 
The internal conditions for validity in designed research (e.g., biomedical clinical trials, psychology 
experiments, demographic surveys) include prespecified study populations, sample sizes, and 
hypotheses concerning relations among study variables. A good design describes the research 
process precisely; deviations from it are problematic not just for ethics boards but also on internal 
scientific grounds (e.g., undermining reproducibility); consequently, prior reviews can be pedagogical 
aids for novice researchers.   
 
In contrast, valid outcomes in discovery-oriented research (e.g., ethnographic fieldwork, 
historiography) depeﾐd oﾐ iﾐ┗estigatoヴsげ ヴespoﾐsi┗eﾐess to pヴediItaHl┞ uﾐpヴediItaHle Ioﾐditioﾐs 
encountered during primary research.  Research plans serve as orienting rationales, but for outcomes 
to have value, research enactments must respond to the unforeseeable actualities of real-world 
conditions that researchers cannot control.    
 
The standardizing effects of formalization worsened as ethics board administrators professionalized 
during the 1990s, developing their own ethical sensibility. Along with a principled habitus of 
procedure and documentation, administrators valorize fairness (uniform treatment), discounting 
differences among the epistemologies, interests, and practices of the subjects of regulation.  In 
practice, because ethics reviews employ a designed-research standard, the impacts of the fairness 
principle are anything but fair.   
 
In a formalized oversight environment where their work is evaluated by designed research standards, 
anthropologists confront a double bind (Lederman 2016). If they describe their reseaヴIh as さnot 
desigﾐedざ, the┞ ヴisk Heiﾐg laHelled uﾐpヴiﾐIipled oヴ uﾐdisIipliﾐed. Alteヴﾐati┗el┞, if the┞ ﾏetaphoヴize 
theiヴ ┘oヴk iﾐ desigﾐ teヴﾏs ふさsaﾏpliﾐgざ, さh┞pothesis-testiﾐgざぶ, the┞ ヴisk Heiﾐg held liteヴall┞ to those 
standards.  
 
In that environment, claヴit┞ IoﾐIeヴﾐiﾐg aﾐthヴopolog┞げs distiﾐIti┗e ┗alue-added is a necessary basis 
foヴ Ihalleﾐgiﾐg the さfaiヴﾐessざ of ethiIs Hoaヴdsげ ヴeliaﾐIe oﾐ desigﾐ staﾐdaヴds as the uﾐi┗eヴsal ﾐoヴﾏ. 
Complementing the replicable abstractions of controlled-conditions research, the value of 
field┘oヴkeヴsげ disIipliﾐed defeヴeﾐIe to theiヴ host Ioﾏﾏuﾐit┞げs IiヴIuﾏstaﾐIes is the ヴealisﾏ eﾐaHled 
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Doing anything well takes practice; doing anthropology ethically means doing ethics 
anthropologically, with socially engaged understanding.  The entrenchment of formal ethics oversight 
in the US undermines the reproduction of craft (following Lave 2011). It distorts the transmission of 
field ethics by privileging formal compliance over practical competeﾐIe: e.g., H┞ pヴi┗ilegiﾐg さiﾐfoヴﾏed 
Ioﾐseﾐtざ doIuﾏeﾐtatioﾐ ふas the pヴoIeduヴal ﾏeaﾐs eﾐsuヴiﾐg さヴespeIt foヴ peヴsoﾐsざぶ o┗eヴ eﾐaItiﾐg 
respect through the determined acquisition of contextual social-relational judgement (which may 
mean taking sides and stands). Where forﾏalizatioﾐ geﾐeralizes desigﾐed research’s ethical 
standards, studeﾐts ha┗e a haヴd tiﾏe gヴaspiﾐg the positi┗e ┗alue of aﾐthヴopologiIal field┘oヴkげs 
distiﾐIti┗el┞ eﾏeヴgeﾐt aﾐd iﾐe┗itaHl┞ seleIti┗e ヴespoﾐsi┗eﾐess to e┗eﾐts aﾐd paヴtiIipaﾐtsげ iﾐteヴests. 
Instead, formal ethics reviews treat such responsiveness as irresponsible both ethically and 
epistemologically.   
 
In short, US social research has undergone institutionalized ethics reviews for so long that we risk 
forgetting that compliance with philosophical principles and administrative procedures does not 
render researchers ethically competent in practice. For novice fieldworkers, standardized, design-
oriented ethics reviews actively subvert ethical competence by framing responsiveness to 
unpredictable field circumstances (the very means for ethnographic understanding) as ethically 
suspect. Institutionalized research oversight will promote an ethical anthropology only if 
administrators formally recognize the values integral to discovery-oriented research styles. 
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Data management is critical to archaeology. As archaeologists, we collect and integrate data from 
many places and sources ranging from the field to labs to libraries. While the challenges of 
archaeological data management are many, I address two issues in relation to the key ideas set forth 
in this forum: (1) co-production of data and (2) raw vs. post-processed data. In the end, I frame the 
discussion in regard to problematic and contested concepts associated with policies, standards, and 
さHestざ pヴaItiIes.  
 
Archaeologists are anthropologists. Our work is cultural heritage; thus, ouヴ goal is ﾐot siﾏpl┞ to さdig 
upざ the past Hut to e┝aﾏine the past for the benefit of present and future generations (UNESCO 
2016). Cultural heritage is both tangible and intangible and as archaeologists we enter into 
negotiations and relationships with many stakeholders such as local communities, cultural, academic, 
and commercial organizations, and government agencies. I concur with others in this forum that a 
key concern for anthropology is ethical co-production of data and knowledge. Who, if anyone owns 
the data we collect? Do community members, governments, academic institutions, or do we own 
these data? These challenging questions are not new to anthropology (Pels this issue); however, 
digital technologies have increased the complexities associated with data, which are increasingly 
acquired, analyzed, and disseminated as collaborative process comprising overlapping and iterative 
phases of data management (Boog et al this issue).  
 
Castillo (this issue) contends that ethical researchers, not ethics governance is critical for ethic 
research. In this vein, she argues we need to restructure education to make ethics integral to 
pedagogy. While I agree this is an important component, I contend that we can more ethically co-
produce data with the communities whose heritage we collect and study by including them in the 
research process not only as consultants but as designers of research strategy from the start. 
Community members should be involved in decision making on data collection, processing, and 
dissemination. For this approach to work, we must make concerted efforts to ensure that 
communities are learning the skills and have access to the software required to truly be involved in 
the co-production of data and ultimately knowledge (van der Elst et al 2011).  
 
The difference between data knowledge leads to my second point—さヴa┘ざ ┗s. post-processed data. 
This difference raises several questions: What is data? Is it only the initial observations we record? 
What about post-processed data—are these simply data or have they become knowledge? The 
concept of data is fuzzy and issues regarding data ownership are both legal and ethical (Clarke 2017). 
I give an example using 3D digital archaeology. 3D surveying collects raw data of extant 
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(i.e. original survey data), but rather has been transformed into post-processed data for various 
purposes via 3D modeling (Richards-Rissetto and von Schwerin 2017).  
 
Three issues arise. First, 3D datasets are massive with large storage costs and requiring expertise for 
management—who is responsible for this data management? Second, raw data and subsequent 
derivatives (e.g. 3D mesh) require not only storage of x, y, and z data but also metadata and 
paradata—if ┘e do ﾐot stoヴe these さotheヴざ data pヴopeヴl┞ iﾐ assoIiatioﾐ ┘ith eaIh otheヴ ┘e Ioﾐfヴoﾐt 
ethical challenges in regard to data preservation and scientific inquiry (we need all the data to 
reproduce results). The third issue brings together ethics and law (policy) and raises questions about 
who owns data derivatives. According to copyright law, raw data cannot be owned because they are 
not the original or creative expression of ideas; however, data derivatives require expertise, 
originality, and/or creativity so should be protected by copyright.  
 
While copyright is an ongoing debate, it leads back to ethical challenges of co-produced data. Not 
only do we have to deteヴﾏiﾐe ┘ho o┘ﾐs the さヴa┘ざ data, Hut ┘ho o┘ﾐs the post-processed data, or 
knowledge, that stems from these original data sources. Should these ownership decisions be made 
by laws, institutional policies, or individual communities and researchers? In the digital realm, co-
production of data leads to unique challenges because the process is collaborative and iterative—for 
data management to succeed it must be ongoing. But who is ethically responsible for managing these 
data? If we cannot agree on ownership, how can we determine who is responsible for data 
management? Additionally, is it enough for the data to be preserved in a dark archive? Or are we 
ethically responsible for making them re-usable and re-purposable to benefit present and future 
generations? Do we ﾐeed staﾐdaヴds, legal oヴ iﾐstitutioﾐal poliIies, oヴ ┘ill さHestざ pヴaItiIes suffiIe to 
allow for flexibility that underpins anthropological research (Sleeboom-Faulkner and Simpson this 
issue)? While I have posed more questions than answers, I agree with others of this forum that 
promoting and facilitating discourse about ethics and data management is invaluable.  
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Peter Pels, Leiden University 
 
The Leiden Data management position statement was originally drawn up specifically with an eye to 
ethnographic research. The above comments address a far wider set of concerns, beyond, if you 
want, the ethnographic けHiasげ to┘aヴds Io-production of knowledge with interlocutors in the field of 
research. Especially Heather Richards-‘issettoげs Ioﾏﾏeﾐt, aﾐd her focus on what happens to 
archaeological data draws us not only towards considering heritage (which I regard as an 
interdisciplinary topic which requires ethnography and history as well), but also towards the issue of 
how raw data are processed by researchers into knowledge they (partially) ざo┘ﾐざ. This highlights the 
current lament by many colleagues that university governments too often disregard the creative 
labor put into processing research materials by researchers (which puts forward a claim to ownership 
that has to be respected as relatively autonomous from the claim to own data by their employers, 
whether these are public academies or private corporations). Both directions – the broadening of the 
care for data towards both co-producing interlocutors and towards creative researchers – can be 
found (among other places) in the recent reconceptualization of さ┗isual aﾐthヴopolog┞ざ as さﾏulti-
ﾏodal aﾐthヴopolog┞ざ ふsee Colliﾐs et al. (2017). However, the discussion about data management 
shows that such a rethinking of anthropology as multimodal must be extremely wary of adopting 
neoliberal ideologies of transparency – ideologies that ┘e iﾐIヴeasiﾐgl┞ assoIiate ┘ith digital soIiet┞げs 
own forms of reproducing inequality (Facebook!). 
 
This is fuel for a continuation of the discussion at a later stage, and I am very happy that the contacts 
and discussion between anthropologists that have led to this Forum publication will indeed be 
pursued at several national and international venues later this year. It is not just the conviction of 
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of science, especially where respect for difference and history ask for methodologies that these 
dominant models tend to marginalize. I hope that we will continue working towards a more explicit 
recognition of such variety in our funding agencies, universities, and other places of work. 
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